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1 Introduction
Agricultural development agencies appear to
have a great deal to gain from setting up
feedback systems in their work, so decision-
makers can hear directly from farmers and other
constituents.
Feedback systems can significantly boost impact,
by creating incentives for staff to focus on
beneficiaries’ priorities. They can generate
powerful measurement data for decision-makers
and put the core principle of empowerment into
practice. Managers can use the data to monitor
how well activities are being implemented and
how well they are meeting peoples’ actual
priorities – allowing them to respond to major
risks to impact on development projects.
However, surprisingly, feedback systems are not
often implemented in agricultural development
agencies. Proven techniques are available and
being improved through new technologies. But
the established incentives push against using
feedback, so the costs currently outweigh the
benefits for managers and organisations alike.
This article starts with a short review of the
current debate on reforming accountability
mechanisms in aid. It introduces the concept of
feedback, relating it to ‘participatory monitoring
and evaluation’ (PM&E) and ‘social
accountability’. Leading examples are presented
of how feedback has been used in development
initiatives, along with evidence of its impact. The
implications for more general practice are
considered. Finally, three key challenges are
identified and potential responses discussed. The
article ends by suggesting reforms that could
strengthen institutional incentives for demand-
led and people-centred development.
2 Reforming accountability
There is an increasingly open and urgent debate
about agricultural development agencies’ need to
reform their accountability mechanisms and, in
particular, to be more accountable to poor farmers. 
For example, a 2010 global review of agricultural
research for development concluded that ‘… a
change is needed in the incentive structures in
the national and international research
community to deliver impacts for the poor…
[S]ystems need to be more accountable to their
beneficiaries’ (Lele et al. 2010: 2). A 2008 review
made substantial recommendations to reform
management and governance across the
Consultative Group on International
Agricultural Research (CGIAR) System (CGIAR
2008). In 2007, the Farmer First Revisited
workshop found that ‘farmer first’ – or
participatory – methods have a crucial role to
play but remain the exception rather than the
rule in general practice. Ashby noted that
bureaucracies ‘lacked – and still lack –
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accountability for satisfying demand for
innovation from the poor’ (Ashby 2009: 39).
These concerns are mirrored in the wider
development sector. Barder makes an urgent case
to reform bilateral aid, emphasising the need for
more appropriate organisational incentives and to
fix ‘the broken feedback loop connecting the
intended beneficiaries and decision-makers’
(Barder 2009: 1). Ebrahim describes major
shortfalls in the World Bank’s accountability
mechanisms, noting that while the ‘World Bank
has … recognised that empowering the poor to
influence the decisions that will affect their lives
is a critical dimension of development’, its own
participatory practice is persistently limited,
largely as a result of the incentives that shape
staff priorities (Ebrahim 2009: 3). Curiously, as in
most agencies, participation is neither monitored
nor managed consistently.
The 2008/09 UNIFEM Progress of the World’s
Women Report argues that the key to ending
gender discrimination and achieving the
Millennium Development Goals lies in reforming
accountability mechanisms, so decision-makers
are answerable to women (Goetz 2008).
These arguments draw from a deep literature on
development practice. For instance, Ellerman
has argued that development interventions are
effective when they ‘help people help
themselves’: when they support people’s own
efforts to improve their lives and respect people’s
autonomy to make decisions about their own
lives. This has the direct implication that
external interventions must be sensitively
informed by local people’s preferences and
priorities at every stage of planning,
implementation and review, as a cornerstone of
success. In other words appropriate
‘participation’ or accountability to beneficiaries
is crucial for impact (Ellerman 2005).
Riddell’s vast review of 40 years of efforts to
measure ‘whether aid works’ finds that the
studies available ‘do not provide a reliable guide
on the overall … contribution of aid to
development and poverty reduction. They never
will’ (Riddell 2007: 254). He argues that the
more important question is ‘how can aid to poor
countries be made effective? ’. This strongly
suggests that efforts to measure the ‘impact’ and
‘performance’ of development agencies could
focus on the contribution that agencies make to
people and institutions’ own efforts, rather than
solely on ultimate social changes.
These authors and others argue that
development actors face an urgent need to
reform how performance is defined and measured
and as a result how funds are distributed.
Current incentives tend to encourage top-down
and technical approaches which have repeatedly
proved to have limited impact. The established
accountability mechanisms do not encourage
development agencies to nurture poor people and
farmers’ own efforts to tackle poverty and
strengthen their self-reliance. There is a well-
recognised conflict between development values
of empowerment and participation on the one
hand and management and accountability
systems on the other.
3 Feedback systems
Feedback systems appear to have an important
role to play in bridging this gap and reforming
incentive systems. 
By ‘feedback system’ we mean a systematic
approach to collecting the views of farmers and
other key stakeholders about the quality and
impact of work undertaken by a development
agency, generating quantitative data. The data
may describe different dimensions of
stakeholders’ satisfaction with the work
undertaken, in terms that they find meaningful
themselves. In other words, the data is based on
stakeholders’ perceptions and reports of their
own experiences. They may be used to inform
management decisions about future activities.
There are significant ethical considerations in
implementing feedback systems in development
programmes, discussed below.
Based on reasoning and the best available
evidence, our argument is that, in the significant
majority of projects, quantified summaries of
farmers’ views can be collected in a practical and
contextually appropriate way. These can
represent one important, often excluded,
perspective on development agencies’
performance. If listened to and acted on, the
data will improve impact and sustainability. The
process of generating feedback can be inherently
empowering, privileging the views of less
powerful people and building their confidence to
engage with authorities. The data would provide
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powerful performance indicators for donors and
senior decision-makers, to inform resource
allocation and operational direction. This creates
incentives for operational staff and managers to
focus their attention on intended beneficiaries
and to be responsive to their changing priorities.
As a result, feedback systems can create an
institutional link between participatory processes
and management systems.
To an extent, this argument applies the
principles of customer satisfaction from the
commercial world to the development context
(see Bonbright and Power, this IDS Bulletin). 
Feedback systems are a type of PM&E practice.
Estrella and Gaventa trace this approach back to
the 1970s. They note that PM&E is a highly
political exercise, involving negotiations about
whose views count, and what indicators or social
changes are significant, as well as what changes
have taken place. As such, it is linked to issues of
inclusiveness, power and social transformation.
They also note that there is neither a single
definition of PM&E nor a single method. PM&E
principles have to be adapted to each local
context (Estrella and Gaventa 1998). All these
issues also apply to feedback systems, as
discussed below. Recent innovations in the
marriage of quantitative methods and
participatory practice have opened up new
possibilities, described as a ‘quiet revolution’
allowing new levels of analysis, aggregation and
reporting (Chambers 2007). However,
participatory monitoring and evaluation
approaches remain more often implemented as
one-off pilots than widely applied. 
Building on similar principles, interest in social
accountability has increased in recent years,
linked to the ‘good governance’ agenda. It
suggests that governance can be improved
through citizens demanding better
representation and service-delivery from service
providers. A raft of ‘social accountability’
initiatives have been trialled over the last two
decades including the feedback mechanisms
described below. Civil society organisations have
vigorously promoted these approaches as
mechanisms for making government and private
sector actors more accountable to citizens,
encouraging powerful actors to listen and
respond better to poor people. However, it is
striking that these mechanisms have not been
widely applied within development agencies. We
argue that they could be, for the same reasons.
In this way, development agencies could take a
major step in reforming their own accountability.
They could also strengthen their legitimacy, help
citizens develop the confidence to hold power to
account and develop new models of good
practice. 
3.1 Examples
The examples below describe feedback systems
that have worked and could be applied to
agricultural programmes. They illustrate how
feedback systems can work in development
settings. They are neither comprehensive nor all
taken from agricultural interventions. There is
limited evidence about the impact of feedback
systems and few examples of how these systems
have been used to monitor performance within
development agencies rather than government
programmes.
3.1.1 Citizen report cards
Citizen report cards were developed by the
Public Affairs Centre, an NGO, in Bangalore in
1993. The method generates satisfaction ratings
about public services from a random sample of
users, using market research survey techniques.
It has been used to provide feedback on
government service provision in areas such as
health, water and education, as well as
agricultural extension services. By 2007, it had
been widely disseminated by the World Bank, the
UN, civil society and others, and used in at least
16 countries around the world. (ADB 2007: 4)
Citizen report cards have generated quantified
data on areas such as the levels of services
received, satisfaction with those services and
bribes paid. For example, in Ethiopia in 2005
feedback was collected from over 2,300 farmers
on agricultural extension services. Ninety-one
per cent of farmers reported that an extension
agent was available in their locality. Fifty-three
per cent reported that the agent visited them
once a month or less often, with 22 per cent
saying that the agent never visited. Overall
satisfaction was low with 22 per cent of farmers
saying they were ‘completely satisfied’ and 47 per
cent that they were ‘dissatisfied’. Roughly one
fifth of farmers had borrowed money for
agriculture and related activities, and formal
marketing support was largely absent. All
findings were broken down by region, allowing
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for comparison and benchmarking. The results
have been used to lobby government agencies for
pro-poor improvements in service provision and
there are plans to repeat the report card process
to monitor progress (Bekele 2006).
Citizen report cards have also been used as one
component of the Balanced Scorecard approach,
for instance, to monitor health provision in
Afghanistan within their Poverty Reduction
Strategy Plan. Using a participatory process,
stakeholders jointly selected indicators including
‘overall patient satisfaction’, ‘patient perception of
quality’ and ‘health worker satisfaction’, alongside
more objective measures like drug availability and
training provision (Peters et al. 2007).
An independent assessment by the World Bank
found that, following report card exercises, many
public agencies in Bangalore in India initiated
reform measures and that ‘Bangalore has
witnessed a number of improvements’ (Ravindra
2004: ii). The report cards helped to increase
public awareness of the quality of services and
stimulated citizen groups to demand better
services. However, a follow-up report card also
found that in some cases, corruption had
increased. Results depended on external factors
including the use of information by the media
and civil society, the responsiveness of agencies
and their leaders, the individual context and the
resources available. This suggests that report
cards can increase the pressure for reform and
support the efforts of internal reformers, but are
unlikely to force reform on unwilling or
constrained public leadership.
Citizens’ satisfaction ratings have been found to
increase with improvements in the services
households receive, but also to be influenced by
other factors, such as the services that
neighbours receive (Deichmann and Lall 2003).
This suggests that satisfaction data should be
reviewed with judgement rather than taken as
objective.
3.1.2 Community scorecards
Community scorecards were developed by CARE
in Malawi in 2002, on a project to strengthen
healthcare in poor rural communities. They
adapted the citizen report card method. The
scorecard focuses more on bringing service
providers and users together at a local level to
strengthen understanding, reinforce shared
responsibilities and identify improvements. The
five-step process has developed into a
methodology applied across many different
countries (see Box 1). 
This experience identified specific weaknesses in
service delivery as perceived by users, such as
poor attitudes among health centre staff, limited
communication between health service providers
and users, and little trust in health service
providers. The interface meeting, described as
‘the most important stage’ in the process,
generated a locally owned action plan. When the
scorecard was repeated six months later,
improvements were recorded in indicators such
as staff observing working hours (community
rating increased from 40 to 60), how well staff
listen to patients (community rating increased
from 50 to 85), and some improvements in the
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Box 1 Community scorecard: five steps
1 Planning and preparation. This includes meeting key stakeholders, training facilitators,
identifying service and input entitlements.
2 Community scoring. This starts with a participatory appraisal to identify indicators for
assessment. Community groups use the indicators to score service delivery on
quantitative scales, disaggregated by wealth and gender.
3 Service provider scoring. Step 2 is repeated with local service provider staff.
4 Interface meeting. Service users and providers discuss results and develop a joint action
plan for improvements.
5 Follow up. The action plan is monitored. The process is written up and repeated.
Source CARE Malawi (2007).
availability of drugs and equipment.
Comparisons were usefully made between two
different clusters of health centres during each
of the scorecard processes. 
A project report found that the scorecards were
‘very useful and important’ for planning,
monitoring and evaluating the project’s
performance. It also identified challenges,
including sustainability, involving the poorest
and most vulnerable people, influencing policy,
and extending the model under different
conditions (Shah 2003).
A wider review by the World Bank concluded that
these approaches ‘are powerful and flexible
instruments to promote social accountability in
the delivery of services to poor communities, and
thus to improve the achievement of pro-poor
development outcomes’ (Thindwa et al. 2005: 15).
In 2005, an evaluation examined the impact of
community scorecards1 through a randomised
field experiment in 50 communities from nine
districts in Uganda, focused on primary
healthcare. It concluded that:
[T]he community-based monitoring project
increased the quality and quantity of primary
health care provision. A year after the first
round of [community] meetings we find a
significant difference in the weight of infants
… and a 33 per cent reduction in under five
mortality in the treatment communities.
Utilization for general outpatient services was
20 per cent higher … and the overall effect
across a set of utilization measures is large
and significantly positive’ (Björkman and
Svensson 2009: 1). 
The authors suggest that these impressive
results, at both output and outcome levels, are
more cost effective than the results achieved by
many other health interventions. 
CARE Malawi is currently applying the method
in a food security project, using scorecards to
evaluate itself and village committees. For
instance, communities are assessing seed banks
against criteria they have identified such as the
quality and quantity of seeds, and the training
they receive. ACDI/VOCA, another international
NGO, is using similar methods to assess its
performance providing agricultural extension
services to poor communities in the Philippines.2
These organisations are trail-blazers in using the
methodology to generate management
information within their own programmes.
3.2 Other examples
A 1995 study in Burkina Faso and Guinea found
that farmers’ subjective perceptions of new
varieties of sorghum and rice significantly affect
their adoption decisions (Adesina and Baidu-
Forson 1995). In Senegal, detailed analysis came
to the same conclusion that farmers’ perceptions
were an important factor in adoption rates and
also that these perceptions can be quantified in
ways that make them accessible to programme
teams (Sall et al. 2000). These findings underline
instrumental reasons for development agencies
to monitor farmers’ perceptions.
The World Bank has over 20 years’ experience of
‘beneficiary assessment’, an approach to
assessing the value of activities as perceived by
their principal users (Salmen 2002). The
approach draws on a wide variety of context-
specific methods, generating both qualitative
and quantitative data. However, it has remained
marginal to the Bank’s core operations, arguably
for the reasons outlined by Ebrahim (Ebrahim
2009).
The World Food Programme and CARE
developed the ‘coping strategies index’ which
uses community perceptions to generate a rapid
indicator of household food security, particularly
useful for emergency humanitarian responses. It
generates structured responses – or feedback –
by asking people the single question ‘What do
you do when you don’t have enough food, and
don’t have enough money to buy food?’ Studies
have shown that this data correlates significantly
with other indicators such as food frequency and
asset ownership. It cuts across individual
dimensions of food security and generates a
more comprehensive picture of the issues people
face (Maxwell and Caldwell 2008).
Recent innovations in related fields demonstrate
similar possibilities. In the microfinance sector, a
suite of tools for ‘client assessment’ has been
developed, including client satisfaction, to help
report and manage performance (Woller 2005). A
Bangladeshi social movement provides a
particularly compelling case. They generate
quantified data from participatory processes about
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people’s experiences of social organisation and
empowerment, using a framework that was built
from the bottom up. The data is used to report
performance to donors as well as to monitor
individual staff performance, while all the time
building the skills and confidence of the people the
movement works with (Jupp et al. 2010).
4 Implications
The examples show how development
organisations can use feedback systems to
generate performance data on how satisfied
intended beneficiaries are with how activities are
implemented and what they are achieving. 
A wide range of indicators have been monitored
by asking people for their views, rather than
measuring around them. Carefully used, these
perception-based indicators are empowering and
strengthen dialogue between local people and
service providers about what works in the local
context and why.
They can be used to measure outcomes (like
income changes, nutritional intake and
empowerment); outputs (like technology
adoption, access to services and capacities); and
operational effectiveness (like the quantity and
quality of services received, and the quality of
participation). All data can be disaggregated by
gender, to generate powerful management
information that describes women’s and men’s
different experiences of development efforts. For
instance, imagine the impact on gender
mainstreaming if agencies’ funding was directly
linked to poor women’s assessments of their work.
The approach appears to be useful for advocacy
and capacity-building interventions as well as
direct service delivery, for instance, by collecting
systematic feedback on the quality of policy
advice or training by those intended to benefit
from it. However, as Olken pointed out, the
approach may not be appropriate in all cases, for
instance for auditing road construction or
building a bridge once it has been designed
(Olken 2007). His findings also flag up the
practical issues discussed below and addressed by
ALINe’s six feedback principles (see Box 2).
We recognise that the approach may not be
appropriate in all cases or for all parts of all
projects. For instance, once a bridge has been
approved, the technical job of building it may not
necessarily be improved by greater participation
and feedback.
Feedback data are necessarily subjective. We
argue that they are one important source of data
for decision-making among others, which has to
be interpreted in context. Projects are also likely
to have to monitor a number of other indicators
such as key milestones in project delivery and the
reach and scope of project activities. Evaluations
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Box 2 ALINe’s good practice principles
Based on an extensive review of current practice and our own experience, ALINe has
identified six good practice principles for implementing feedback systems:
1 Adapt systems to the context
2 Develop assessment criteria with respondents
3 Generate quantitative feedback data
4 Report and publish comparative data
5 Discuss findings with respondents and identify actions
6 Repeat the process
These principles summarise practical responses to common difficulties in generating
ethical, powerful and actionable feedback data.
Further information: www.alineplanning.org/feedback (accessed 16 August 2010).
can establish impacts. The subjectivity can be an
advantage in allowing managers to understand
more about which groups are gaining and losing
from a project, giving insights into unavoidable
local political issues (Roche 1999).
Feedback can bring significant advantages in
generating real-time data to demonstrate
whether interventions are being well
implemented and meeting peoples’ priorities,
informing management oversight and testing the
theory of change. History suggests that these are
major risks to most development projects,
greater risks than the initial plan being reliable
and well executed but still not achieving the
expected outcomes. Two acid tests may be:
(i) Would you personally expect your views to be
considered on any major programme impacting
on your life? and (ii) If development agencies
work for public benefit, similar to government
agencies, then shouldn’t the same standards of
transparency, consultation and accountability
apply?
5 Challenges
Feedback systems raise significant ethical issues,
mirroring concerns in participatory practice.
Agencies may solicit the views of people who do
not represent the intended respondents or
beneficiaries. Women are particularly likely to be
excluded at all stages (developing assessment
criteria, giving feedback and discussing findings).
The assumption that ‘a community’ holds a
single view may squeeze out marginal groups or
reinforce the power of dominant groups.
Farmers’ time must be respected and their
informed consent requested. Badly implemented
feedback systems can generate misleading data
for decision-makers and deepen power-
imbalances to the detriment of the most poor
and vulnerable people. Arguably, all feedback
systems – and all development projects – should
undergo an ethical review before they are
implemented. Keystone’s ethical framework
provides one practical approach (Keystone 2009).
There are practical difficulties in collecting
feedback, particularly from the poorest and most
marginalised people. These include: survey
methods, which can be complicated, requiring
skilled design and piloting; data collection
exercises may need to be carefully planned and
facilitated to create conditions for more open
feedback; the most marginalised may speak local
languages or dialects, rather than official
languages; access may be constrained by
practical or cultural issues; there are likely to be
competing demands on management and staff
time at different stages of the project cycle.
Similar practical issues have been faced and
creatively tackled by participatory practice.
There are a wide range of previous experiences
to draw on such as costs reduction by using
modern technology, including mobile phones.
However, there are no blueprint approaches that
can be taken off the shelf without being adapted
to the local context. This is a serious barrier to
implementing feedback systems, raising costs. It
may be possible to develop more simple and
replicable techniques which strike a reasonable
compromise between quality, cost and
applicability.
The most significant barrier to implementing
feedback systems appears to be the incentives
that shape management and organisational
behaviour. Currently, in institutional terms, the
costs consistently outweigh the benefits,
particularly when managers are handling many
different priorities. Managers and organisations
are rewarded more for other behaviours, such as
implementing project plans agreed with donors
on time and in budget, and raising their public
profile. Funding tends to be increasingly short
term and restricted to pre-determined activities,
limiting opportunities for responding to farmer
feedback. Organisations continue to win funds
without robust evidence about their performance
on the ground. Recent empirical research in
Uganda has shown no significant correlation
between NGOs’ organisational survival and the
value that their intended beneficiaries perceive
from their work (Burger and Owens
forthcoming). This appears to be indicative of
incentive systems that shape aid more widely. For
example, see discussion of efforts to reform
gender in an international NGO (Wallace and
Wilson 2005), strengthen participation in the
World Bank (Ebrahim 2009), and improve the
UN’s engagement with small farmer
organisations (McKeon 2009). These suggest
that a central factor in reforming development
bureaucracy is tackling the current reliance on
‘supply-led’ performance monitoring based on
the question ‘did the agency carry out the
activities agreed in the project plan?’
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Incentives could potentially be reshaped by
reforming accountability mechanisms so they
encourage and reward demand-led development,
for instance by:
? donors and senior managers consistently
requiring quantified reports of farmer
satisfaction;
? implementing agencies publishing reports of
farmer satisfaction, creating a new norm in
their practice;
? civil society actors collecting and publishing
feedback data independently of donors and
implementing agencies;
? demonstrating the value added by feedback
and celebrating successes; and
? developing cheaper and simpler feedback tools.
These reforms align with other efforts to improve
‘donorship’ and implementation, such as
involving external actors in planning and
reviewing performance (e.g. Outcome Mapping
and Participatory Impact Pathway Analysis),
strengthening financial transparency (the
International Aid Transparency Initiative),
creating complaints mechanisms (the
Humanitarian Accountability Partnership), and
requiring regular project reviews that involve all
stakeholders in the expectation that plans and
budgets will be significantly adapted (ActionAid’s
Accountability Learning and Planning System).
Collectively, they require significant change to
management structures and practices within
implementing agencies and donors, for instance
prioritising facilitation and participatory skills,
and reinforcing the core value of supporting
autonomous self-determination.
6 Conclusion
Suggestive evidence and reasoning make a
powerful case that feedback systems can unlock
the core problems of accountability in
agricultural development and significantly
increase impact.
The tools and techniques for implementing
feedback systems exist. While there are no off-
the-shelf solutions, there is a wide range of
experience of how good practice principles can
be applied in different contexts.
However, agricultural development agencies lack
the incentives to use feedback systems. The
established systems for assessing performance
and allocating funds do not encourage agencies
to listen and respond to farmers and other
intended beneficiaries.
This article has argued that using feedback to
monitor performance could create the incentives
for demand-led and people-centred development.
This could be a realistic corrective to the
approach of measuring performance compared
to original plans, which creates incentives for
supply-led and agency-centred development.
One powerful reform would be for donors and
senior decision-makers to consistently require
quantified reports of farmer satisfaction.
Progress will rely on leadership and innovation at
the most senior level. Alternatively, a
groundswell of demand from the bottom up
could force change.
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Notes
1 This article uses the terms ‘community
monitoring’ and ‘citizen report card’ to
describe the method laid out as ‘community
scorecard’ in the literature and above.
2 Both initiatives are described in the ALINe
Farmer Voice Awards in 2010, recognising
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